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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4383 
_____________ 
 
RENATO MANUEL DA COSTA PONTA-GARCIA, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A035 248 950) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 21, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 22, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Renato Manuel Da Costa Ponta-Garcia petitions for review of an order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) that dismissed his appeal from an 
 
2 
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) removal order.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
I. 
Ponta-Garcia is a native and citizen of Portugal.  His parents brought him to the 
United States in 1978 at the age of nine as a lawful permanent resident.  The family soon 
thereafter went to Bermuda for several years and then returned, apparently on visitors’ 
visas.  An IJ found the family to be removable in 1987 for overstaying their visas and 
granted them voluntary departure, but the family did not leave.  Ponta-Garcia, apparently 
believing he was still a permanent resident, applied in 1990 for a “New Alien 
Registration Receipt Card,” which was granted, and which he used several times to go to 
Canada and return.  In 2007, he was notified that the Government intended to reinstate 
the twenty-year-old order of removal.  An immigration officer found the order of removal 
was subject to reinstatement, and Ponta-Garcia filed a petition for review, challenging the 
regulation allowing reinstatement without a hearing before an IJ.  This Court found the 
regulation was a reasonable construction of the statute, but remanded because it was not 
clear whether the 1987 removal order had been invalidated, nor was it clear that Ponta-
Garcia had reentered the country illegally after his last trip to Canada.  Ponta-Garcia v. 
Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Rather than pursue the reinstatement, the Government then issued a notice to 
appear (“NTA”) on March 2, 2009, listing charges from § 212(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) (regarding inadmissibility of aliens).  Ponta-Garcia objected, 
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arguing that the charges should be under § 237 (regarding removability of aliens).  The IJ 
issued an interlocutory ruling on September 24, 2009, agreeing that because Ponta-Garcia 
had been admitted to the U.S. from Canada, the NTA should charge removability under 
§ 237, rather than inadmissibility under § 212(a).  A.R. 479.  The IJ ordered the 
Government to amend the NTA, or the proceedings would be terminated.  Id.  However, 
the IJ also found Ponta-Garcia’s reliance on the Government’s issuance of an I-551 
(evidencing lawful permanent residence) was immaterial to the resolution of the matter, 
and that issuance of the I-551 was purely ministerial, and conferred no status on Ponta-
Garcia.  A.R. 478. 
 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Form I-261, Additional 
Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability on October 23, 2009, charging Ponta-Garcia, 
inter alia, with removability under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an 
aggravated felony as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(D) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D)].  A.R. 
522-24.  The IJ issued another interlocutory ruling on November 12, 2009, and sustained 
 
4 
the aggravated felony ground of removal.1  On May 13, 2010, the IJ ordered Ponta-
Garcia removed to Portugal, incorporating his two earlier interlocutory decisions.2
The BIA agreed with the IJ’s finding that Ponta-Garcia’s 2005 conviction for the 
offense of Conducting a Financial Transaction with the Intent to Avoid a Transaction 
Reporting Requirement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(C) was an aggravated 
felony.  The BIA noted that § 101(a)(43)(D) defines an aggravated felony as “an offense 
described in section 1956 of title 18, United States Code (relating to laundering of 
monetary instruments) . . . if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000.”  The BIA found 
that because Ponta-Garcia was convicted under section 1956, there was a “categorical 
 
On appeal, Ponta-Garcia raised the claim that the Government was estopped from 
refusing to recognize his status as a permanent resident, and that the IJ erred in finding 
him removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  The BIA stated that 
the “apparent errors” in issuing Ponta-Garcia an I-551 and allowing him to travel to and 
from the United States without incident “do not prevent the government from now 
refusing to recognize his former lawful permanent resident status.”  BIA decision at 2. 
                                                 
1 The DHS submitted another I-261, dated November 6, 2009, and charging Ponta-
Garcia with removal for having been convicted of a controlled substance violation.  A.R. 
520.  The IJ’s decision does not mention this charge of removability. 
2 Although this decision mentions the November 6, 2009 NTA, the decision does 
not mention a ruling regarding Ponta-Garcia’s removability for the controlled substance 
violation, nor does it mention the other charges of removability listed in the October 23, 
2009 NTA (related to being in the United States without proper documentation, and  
entering or attempting to enter the United States without being admitted). 
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match,” and the only question was whether the evidence established that the amount of 
funds exceeded $10,000.  BIA decision at 3.  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s finding that 
the “Superseding indictment, which took the place of the Indictment before the 
respondent pled guilty,” showed “laundered funds exceeding $10,000.”  Id.  The BIA 
noted that the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) indicated that Ponta-Garcia 
“pled guilty to Counts I-III of the Superseding Indictment.”  Id. 
The BIA also held that to the extent Ponta-Garcia was raising a due process 
challenge based on the IJ failing to “properly admit evidence into the record and fail[ing] 
to allow [him] to testify regarding his understanding of the plea agreement,” the argument 
was rejected, as Ponta-Garcia had not shown how he was prejudiced by the alleged 
violation.  Id. 
Ponta-Garcia filed a timely, counseled petition for review and a motion for stay of 
removal.  The Government filed a motion to dismiss/opposition to the stay request.  The 
stay motion was granted, and the Government’s motion to dismiss was referred to this 
panel. 
II. 
We lack jurisdiction to consider a petition for review filed by an alien who has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony or certain controlled substance offenses.  INA 
§ 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)].  However, we can consider the jurisdictional 
prerequisite of whether the alien’s conviction constitutes an aggravated felony, and we 
can also hear “constitutional claims and questions of law” (but not factual challenges) 
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even if presented by an alien convicted of an aggravated felony or controlled substance 
offense.  Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010).  Ponta-Garcia argues 
that his § 1956 conviction is not an aggravated felony, and he also raises due process 
issues.  We have jurisdiction to consider these claims. 
Ponta-Garcia also spends much of his brief arguing that the Government should be 
equitably estopped “from placing him in removal proceedings, . . . since the INS 
conferred lawful permanent resident status on [him] on numerous occasions over a period 
of years,” and he relied on that status.  The Government argues that we do not have 
jurisdiction to consider this argument, which involves factual determinations.  Given our 
holding that Ponta-Garcia’s 2005 conviction constitutes an aggravated felony (see 
discussion below), we agree with the Government that any consideration of whether 
Ponta-Garcia is a legal permanent resident is rendered unnecessary, and we need not 
consider whether we have jurisdiction to consider any portion of Ponta-Garcia’s estoppel 
argument.3
 We now turn to the question of whether Ponta-Garcia’s 2005 conviction is an 
aggravated felony.  Ponta-Garcia attacks the aggravated felony finding on two fronts:  
 
III. 
                                                 
3 It is not clear why Ponta-Garcia argues that he is a permanent resident.  Even if 
he were to prevail on the argument, that would not render him non-removable.  
Permanent residents are subject to less stringent eligibility requirements for cancellation 
of removal, compare INA  § 240A(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)], with § 240A(b) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)], but Ponta-Garcia did not apply for cancellation of removal (and an 
aggravated felony conviction precludes eligibility for cancellation of removal). 
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first, he argues that it is not clear that his conviction involved money laundering; and 
second, he argues that the IJ improperly consulted a Superseding Indictment and his PSR 
in determining that the amounts involved exceeded $10,000. 
Ponta-Garcia’s first argument seems to be based on his belief that INA 
§ 101(a)(43)(D) only applies to convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 if they involved 
money laundering.  His argument fails under the reasoning of Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 
465 (3d Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds.  In Patel, we held that the 
parenthetical in the similarly structured definition of “aggravated felony” found in INA 
§ 101(a)(43)(N)4
Id. at 470-71 (footnote omitted).  We find that “(relating to laundering of monetary 
instruments)” in subsection “D” is thus just a shorthand description, and does not mean 
 was “descriptive and not restrictive” and was “nothing more than a 
shorthand description of all of the offenses listed in INA § 274(a)(1)(A).”  Id. at 470.  
The Court went on to say that: 
[A]s a matter of general structure and context, . . . Congress included a 
catalogue of aggravated felonies and described each by reference to 
criminal offenses outside the confines of the INA; viz., offenses contained 
in titles 18, 21, 26 and 50 of the United States Code.  Specifically, 
subparagraphs (D), (E), (H), (I), (J), (K), (L), (M), and (P) of INA 
§ 101(a)(43) define aggravated felonies by specific reference to section 
numbers of the Code and then include a parenthetical setting forth the 
general nature of the referenced offenses.  This leads us to conclude that 
these parentheticals are intended only as a general illustration of the 
referenced criminal statutes. 
 
                                                 
4 Section 101(a)(43)(N) defines “aggravated felony” as “an offense described in 
paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 274(a) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)] (relating to alien 
smuggling) . . . .” 
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that only convictions strictly denominated as “money laundering” convictions are 
included in the definition.5
 The second argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Nijhawan 
v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2009).  In Nijhawan, the Court held that agencies and 
courts considering whether a conviction is an aggravated felony under INA 
§ 101(a)(43)(M)
 
6
Further, even consulting only the record of conviction (including the charging 
document and written plea agreement), it is clear that the “amount of the funds exceeded 
 should apply a “circumstance-specific” approach, rather than a 
categorical approach, to determine whether the alien’s crime involved over $10,000 loss 
to the victim.  In Nijhawan, the alien had stipulated at sentencing that the loss exceeded 
$100 million.  Id. at 2298.  The Court held that it was not unfair for the IJ to refer to that 
sentencing-related material in determining that the conviction was an aggravated felony.  
Id. at 2303.  We see no reason to treat subsection “D” any differently.  Section 1956, like 
the statute referenced in subsection “M,” does not have a monetary amount as an element 
of the crime.  Thus, subsection “D” similarly would require the agency or the courts to 
look to the “specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s commission” of the crime 
in order to determine the amount involved in the crime.  See Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 
2302. 
                                                 
5 Further, section 1956 is entitled “Laundering of monetary instruments.” 
6 The first subpart of Subsection “M” defines “aggravated felony” as an offense 
that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim of victims exceeds $10,000.” 
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$10,000.”  Ponta-Garcia contested the IJ’s finding that he pled guilty to the “Superseding 
Indictment” (A.R. 458-66 – including monetary amounts), as opposed to the original 
“Indictment” (A.R. 467-74 – no monetary amounts included).  Ponta-Garcia’s plea 
agreement states that he was pleading guilty to Counts I-III of the “Indictment.”  A.R. 
361-69.  The BIA found that “the reference to the ‘Indictment’ in the Judgment [of 
conviction] is a reference to the Superseding Indictment, which took the place of the 
Indictment before [Ponta-Garcia] pled guilty.”  BIA decision at 3.  That finding is logical, 
and is further supported by this fact:  the plea agreement states, inter alia, that Ponta-
Garcia “will admit the Sentencing Allegations as stated in the Indictment.”  A.R. 361.  
The original Indictment does not contain any sentencing allegations, but the Superseding 
Indictment contains a list of five numbered paragraphs with the caption, “Sentencing 
Allegations.”  A.R. 460.  In any event, we do not find that the BIA erred in considering 
that the PSR stated that Ponta-Garcia pled guilty “to the three-count Superseding 
Indictment.”  A.R. 272. 
Each Count of the Superseding Indictment clearly shows that amounts exceeding 
$10,000 were involved: 
That on or about March 6, 2004, in the District of Rhode Island, the 
defendant, RENATO M. GARCIA, a/k/a Renato Da Costa Ponta-Garcia, 
with the intent to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under Federal 
law, did knowingly and willfully conduct and attempt to conduct a financial 
transaction affecting interstate commerce involving property, to wit:  
$15,000 in United States currency, represented by a person acting at the 
direction of and with the approval of a Federal official authorized to 
investigate violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, to be the proceeds of specified 
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unlawful activity, to wit:  the sale and distribution of controlled substances; 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(C). 
 
Count I, A.R. 458.  The remaining two counts contain similar allegations; Count II 
includes an amount of $15,000, and Count III includes an amount of $17,500.  We thus 
agree with the BIA that Ponta-Garcia’s conviction was for an aggravated felony. 
IV. 
Finally, Ponta-Garcia argues that his right to due process was violated when:  
(1) the IJ failed to allow him to testify regarding his understanding of his plea agreement; 
(2) the amended NTA was not “introduced into the record, and more importantly, was 
never pled to”; and (3) he was not allowed to testify regarding his belief that he was a 
permanent resident.  We agree with the BIA and the Government that Ponta-Garcia has 
not shown that he was prejudiced by any of these purported violations.  Bradley v. Att’y 
Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2010) (successful due process challenge requires 
showing of substantial prejudice).  As noted, the plea agreement introduced by Ponta-
Garcia lends support to the IJ’s finding that he pled guilty to the Superseding Indictment.  
Ponta-Garcia has not explained how his testimony would undermine the finding.  As to 
his second allegation, we agree that the better practice would have been for the IJ to enter 
pleadings on the amended NTAs; however, Ponta-Garcia was clearly aware that he was 
charged with being removable because of his § 1956 conviction, and he contested the 
allegation that the conviction was an aggravated felony in a brief to the IJ, see A.R. 169-
78, as well as in his brief to the BIA, see A.R. 16-21.  The fact that he did not have a 
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chance to specifically say in a hearing that he “denied” the charge did not prejudice him 
in any way.  As to the third allegation, as Ponta-Garcia’s permanent resident status (or 
lack thereof) was not relevant to removability, he was not prejudiced by not being able to 
testify about the issue. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
